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FOREWORD
Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) inherited a difficult and volatile domestic situation following the overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi. The new
leadership faces serious and simultaneous challenges
in all areas of statehood. Libya’s key geostrategic position, and role in hydrocarbon production and exportation, means that the course of internal developments
there is crucial not only to the Libyan people, but also
to neighboring countries both in North Africa and
across the Mediterranean in southern Europe. The
mitigation or prevention of conditions that could lead
to Libya becoming a failing or failed state is of vital
importance.
In this monograph, United Kingdom-based academic Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri reviews the major
challenges to the new Libyan regime, including the
continuing role of tribalism and the difficulty posed
by the NTC’s lack of monopoly on ensuring security
in Tripoli and beyond. Key issues of concern to foreign
partners when engaging with the new Libyan leadership are highlighted, and a number of policy recommendations are made. Libya’s immediate future is of
critical importance, and will determine whether the
country faces state consolidation or state failure.
			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
A peaceful transition to a new form of government
in Libya is of vital importance not only to the people
of Libya, but to neighboring countries—and to security in the broad sense much farther afield. Yet, at the
time of this writing, the new interim leadership remains fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty,
and the inability to enforce security is still a critical
challenge. There is a risk of conditions being created
that could lead to Libya becoming a fragile or indeed
a failed state.
Despite the mitigation of the threat from supporters of the old regime, the interim government has no
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The security risks of Libya’s uncontrolled armed militias are
not restricted to within national borders. By jeopardizing state-building efforts, clashes between militias or
between militias and government authorities threaten
to undermine the security of neighboring countries
and the international community. Risks include renewed waves of refugee flows to Tunisia, Egypt, and
across the Mediterranean to Italy and beyond, and
continuing disruption to oil production, which will
once again deprive the international market of Libyan
oil and harm the economic interests of U.S. and European companies. Furthermore, the current lack of a
capable national army leaves Libya an open playing
field to be exploited by international criminal or terrorist groups active in the region.
A key challenge confronting the interim government in Libya is the creation of political institutions to
provide for the functioning of an effective democratic
state. The interim government is, in effect, inheriting
a stateless state. Drawing up a constitution for Libya
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will not be straightforward. Political infighting between secularists and Islamists has already surfaced
on varying issues of political significance to Libya’s
future, including vital elements, such as the structure
and religious identity of the state. Democratic culture
deficit is another key challenge, since political parties
and civil society institutions were absent from Libya
for more than 4 decades.
The socioeconomic and political factors that led
people to revolt against the regime are equally pertinent to post-conflict stabilization, and require early
attention. Unemployment was a significant long-term
issue in Qadhafi’s Libya, as was frustration at the fall
in standards of living while the country generated billions of dollars from hydrocarbon exports, much of
which was spent on Qadhafi’s foreign policy adventures. Ordinary citizens argued that a country rich in
energy resources with a relatively small population
should be able to offer high living standards to its population, in the same manner as in the rich Gulf states.
A rapid resumption of oil and gas production will not
only assist in the rebuilding of Libya’s infrastructure
and economy; it will alleviate economic pressures on
neighboring countries, as the Libyan economy reabsorbs thousands of Egyptian and Tunisian workers in
different sectors.
The political role of tribes cannot be understated
in determining the future shape of Libya. A number
of attempts to seize power from him prompted Qadhafi to accentuate tribalization, turning to his tribal
kinsmen to counter increased political opposition and
appointing several blood relatives and in-laws to key
security and military positions. Manipulating tribes
and building informal tribal alliances became an important part of Qadhafi’s internal political maneuver-
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ing, with nepotism and favoritism becoming the pillars sustaining Qadhafi’s informal political alliances.
Elements of these tribal dynamics remain in the postrevolution environment, and in the interests of stability and the avoidance of further conflict, their management and mitigation are every bit as important as
they were during the reigns of King Idris and Qadhafi
himself. The key nature of this challenge should not be
underestimated by foreign partners engaging with the
new Libyan regime.
Recommendations.
•	As the Libyan interim government continues
to struggle to maintain law and order while simultaneously facing the daunting tasks of statebuilding ab initio, the United States and other
leading actors in the international community
can assist in maintaining stability by engaging
and providing vitally needed assistance essential to avoid destabilization and deterioration
within Libya, gravid with consequences not
only for Libyan citizens, but for neighbors and
energy consumers both in North Africa and
Europe. The involvement of the international
community should be focused on what Libya
needs in order to perform its functions as an effective sovereign state, both at a national and
international level.
•	The ambitions of the interim government are
inhibited by the lack of a clear security reform
strategy that includes specific measures for the
disarmament and reintegration of revolutionary fighters, and the management of legacy
armaments in general. The sooner the interim
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government launches its security reform plan,
the better the chances of success for political
transition. Assistance to the interim authorities
in implementing security reform in order to
mitigate the risks outlined above should therefore be a priority of the United States and other
foreign partners.
•	Tribes play an important role in the daily life
of many Libyans, and are likely to continue to
do so for the foreseeable future. Under a new
regime that does not favor tribal politics, tribal
leaders might agree to take a limited role at
the national-political level, but will be likely to
want to keep their political influence at the regional level. Leading tribes in different areas of
the country will have great aspirations to play
an important role in their respective regions.
The United States and other foreign partners
engaging with the new Libyan state need to
be aware of the limitations on the power and
reach of that state imposed by the tribal nature
of its society.
•	An important task for the interim government,
and an important step for the stability of the
country, is to organize a truth-recovery and reconciliation initiative. International experience
shows that reconciliation initiatives in postconflict situations or following regime or political change constitute an important step toward
healing the wounds of the past and strengthening political transitions. Given the importance
of reconciliation initiatives for stability during
transition, the United States and other foreign
partners should encourage these efforts and
provide targeted support for the process.
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•	U.S. and United Nations (UN) expertise in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) of armed fighters in post-conflict situations could be of pivotal help to Libya, but such
support should be carefully provided. Although
the situation on the ground at the time of this
writing suggests that the interim government
in Libya would appreciate external help with
the armed militias, any level of visible foreign
military presence in Libya risks igniting more
political instability than it provides. Any DDR
assistance would be best provided through
diplomatic channels in the form of continuous
advisory and monitoring support.
•	Preventing the hostile exploitation of Libya’s
vast territory and largely uncontrolled borders
remains a key task for the international community while Libya still lacks an adequate
national army. The new Libya needs wellequipped and well-trained military forces to
protect and secure its borders and national territory. The new security apparatus that will be
put in place should be trained to play a neutral
role in internal political life, and specifically
avoid domination by or favoritism toward specific tribes or clans over others. A new security
system will reduce the risk of intimidation and
violence during Libya’s political transition. The
United States and other international partners
with the experience of building security forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan are well-placed to offer
this experience to Libya.
•	International nongovernmental organizations
have much to offer the nascent democratic political culture and civil society in Libya. The new
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Libya requires the establishment and strengthening of a party system, elections, media, and
an independent judiciary. Technical assistance
in setting up legal systems on political and
economic fronts is an essential prerequisite for
Libya’s transition toward democracy.

xii

STATE-BUILDING CHALLENGES
IN A POST-REVOLUTION LIBYA
INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 2011, 4 decades of authoritarian
rule by a political regime controversial on both the
regional and world stages came to an end. The killing
of Muammar Qadhafi and the toppling of his regime
marked the end of 8 months of civil war, but only the
beginning of a new phase that promises to be even
more difficult than the Libyan people’s struggle for
political power. The transition toward democracy in
Libya, if there is to be democracy there, and the building of a modern state present a daunting series of hurdles and tensions. The interim government faces the
challenging task of simultaneously holding elections,
demilitarizing and reintegrating militias, fostering
national reconciliation, drafting a new constitution,
restoring security, repairing the damage wrought by
domestic combat operations and foreign airstrikes,
and ensuring economic development to meet the aspirations of its population.
From a political perspective, Libya is not a homogenous country, either ethnically or ideologically. Internal differences are a source of concern to both the
local population and the international community.
Tribal divisions across the country complicate still
further the historical rivalry and divided loyalties between the East and West. Tribalism is a societal reality
in Libya, and it would be naïve to hope that it will
cease to be a critical influence on the post-Qadhafi political scene. Indeed, tribalism was also an important
factor in the survival of that regime: The loyalty of
certain tribes kept the fighting going for months, in-
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cluding after the capital, Tripoli, fell into the hands of
rebels; furthermore, remnants of the Qadhafi regime
still have the potential to present a destabilizing threat
during the transition period. Contradictions between
domestic political forces, as well as interference by
external parties, all suggest that the post-Qadhafi era
will be complex and tense for the foreseeable future.
If a transition period toward building an effective
and democratic state is mishandled or simply takes
too long, conditions could be created that risk Libya
becoming a fragile, or indeed a failed, state. A peaceful transition is of vital importance not only to the
people of Libya, but to neighboring countries and to
security in the broad sense much farther afield. Libya’s geostrategic position is of critical importance not
only to its neighbors in North Africa but also to those
in southern Europe. Hydrocarbon resources and transit render Libya’s stability of even greater significance
to the international community. A rapid resumption
of oil and gas production will not only assist in the
rebuilding of Libya’s infrastructure and economy; it
will alleviate enormous economic pressures on neighboring countries, as the Libyan economy reabsorbs
thousands of Egyptian and Tunisian workers in different sectors.
This monograph will discuss the challenges of Libya’s political transition after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, and seek to highlight the key issues that should
be of concern to the United States and its allies when
engaging with post-Qadhafi Libya. First, the monograph explores the causes of the Libyan upheaval, focusing on the socioeconomic and political factors that
led people to revolt against the regime—since these
issues are equally pertinent to post-conflict stabilization. Second, it examines the tribes as a crucial element
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that crosscuts many of the political and security issues
that Libya faces. Third, the monograph discusses the
key post-revolution challenges facing the provisional
government, such as ideological differences, armed
militias and the collection of weapons, and national
reconciliation. Democratic culture deficit is another
key challenge, since political parties and civil society
institutions were absent from Libya for more than 4
decades. International experience shows that democratic transitions are not smooth and painless processes, and there is no reason to suspect that Libya will be
an exception.
The monograph draws on open-source material in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, and on
interviews with Libyan nationals and foreign diplomats in Tripoli and Benghazi, all of whom requested
anonymity.
THE SEEDS OF LIBYA’S FEBRUARY 17, 2011,
REVOLUTION
The precedent set by the successful oustings of the
Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, gave weight and focus
to a wide range of other factors that pushed Libyans
to begin mass protests in the eastern cities of Benghazi
and al-Baydaa in February 2011. Both economic grievances and resentment of the autocratic nature of the
Qadhafi regime lay behind the rapid development of
the protests and eventual open insurrection.
The revolution that finally toppled Qadhafi was
not the first uprising that Libya had experienced during his rule. Protests against his oppressive regime
were relatively frequent, particularly in the eastern
region of the country. These protests were always
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brutally quelled by military and security forces. Over
more than 4 decades, Qadhafi faced several instances
of serious political challenge by internal groups, foreign governments, and even from close colleagues
aiming to overthrow him. He survived several failed
coups d’état from the 1970s onward. The failed attempt
with the most significant long-term consequences
came in 1993, leading Qadhafi to make major changes
in his security apparatus and to marginalize most of
the remaining comrades-in-arms from his own 1969
revolution.
This section will examine the issues that triggered
the February revolution, since addressing these same
issues remains a key task for the new Libyan regime
in transition.
Limited Political Openings.
Rather than arising overnight, discontent with
the pace and depth of political reform among Libyan intellectuals, and even some entrenched political
elites, had been a constant factor—characterized by
skepticism over the promises by the regime to introduce greater democracy. The democratization efforts
of Saif al-Islam, Qadhafi’s second eldest son, clashed
continuously with the authoritarian policies of the old
guard. Reform-oriented transition toward democracy
is by nature a lengthy process, requiring constant negotiation of changes to be introduced between the
regime and democratizing elites; but after 4 decades
of Qadhafi’s authoritarian rule, patience for a lengthy
process was exhausted.
The regime’s hardliners were concerned that largescale and rapid changes could undermine the country’s political stability. These groups included those
who had benefited from the system economically and
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politically. The tussle between the two groups was
demonstrated through various public events, such as
the sidelining of ministers and senior officers or the
closure of newspapers. Several journalists working
for Saif al-Islam’s publishing company, al-Ghad, were
arrested by the Libyan authorities and later released
by Qadhafi in late 2010.1 Tom Malinowski, director of
Human Rights Watch in Washington, believed he observed the struggle between the reformers and hardliners first hand during an event organized to launch a
report on the human rights situation in Libya in 2009.
He commented that, “There are clearly forces pressing
for greater openness. That’s why we’re here. But there
are also powerful forces who don’t want this process
to succeed.”2
Qadhafi’s unwillingness to change the political system not only frustrated broad sectors of the ordinary
Libyan population, but also upset his former close
collaborators from various periods of his rule. His
one-man style of leadership left room for few friends
around him. Many of his revolutionary colleagues,
senior officers, and technocrats rebelled or quit their
positions. In the 1970s and 1980s, some abandoned the
country and joined opposition groups abroad. Key issues of disagreement between Qadhafi and his close
associates varied over the years, but the most important ones included:
•	Spending on financing and training insurgencies abroad;
•	Direct intervention in other countries’ internal
affairs, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, by
supporting coups and rebel groups over the
course of decades;3
•	The building of a large man-made river in the
Libyan desert, seen as an irrational diversion
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of resources at a time of financial constraints in
the 1980s;4
•	Plans for the succession and repeated long-term
speculation over the possible appointment of
one of Qadhafi’s sons to take his position.
Over the last decade of Qadhafi’s rule, the prominent role of Saif al-Islam in public life and political
spheres was perceived as a strong indication of his future political role. In addition to Saif al-Islam’s ownership of the al-Ghad media company, his position as
head of the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation had allowed him to engage in
political initiatives nationally and internationally. In
2009, a call by Qadhafi on Libyan regional and tribal
leaders to find an official job for his son was well received: Saif al-Islam was appointed head of the Popular Social Leadership Committees, a position that allowed him broad legislative and executive powers.
Following his election, he commented that this official
position would allow him to deliver his political and
economic reform plan entitled “Libya of Tomorrow.”5
At the same time, the lack of clarity over Qadhafi’s
plans for succession of power created enemies among
both his close collaborators and ordinary Libyans. Silence over the succession plan, combined with the rising star of Saif al-Islam, created animosities within Qadhafi’s inner circle of friends, known as the “men of the
tent”—since the unspoken rule for decades had been
that if Qadhafi were to disappear from the political
scene, it would be one of his revolutionary colleagues
who would be his successor. Saif al-Islam’s new political prominence was envied, because no other political
figure was afforded the same opportunities; Qadhafi’s
one-man style of leadership naturally precluded the
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emergence of any other leader in public spheres. The
fact that Saif al-Islam was allowed to introduce new
political initiatives and criticize his father’s regime—
in a context in which even Qadhafi’s close colleagues
refrained from questioning his ideas—was perceived
as a further implicit signal of Qadhafi’s intention to
designate him as successor.
Economic Factors.
The limited market economy reforms introduced
by Qadhafi in the late-1990s and during the 2000s were
not sufficient to relieve poverty for a large number of
ordinary Libyans, and instead were perceived as benefiting a small number of Qadhafi’s family members
and his inner circle of loyal friends. This bred pessimism with regard to any likelihood of positive economic change in Libya under the former regime.
Unemployment was a significant long-term issue
in Qadhafi’s Libya. Official sources placed Libya’s
2009 unemployment rate at 20.74 percent;6 with the
youth unemployment rate higher, at 27 percent;7 at the
time, 65 percent of the country’s population was less
than 35 years old. In parallel with other Arab oil-rich
countries, high unemployment in Libya results largely from a long-term mismatch between the education
system and the skills needed by the growing private
sector, further complicated by high job expectations
by graduates. A high proportion of Libyan graduates
lack the adequate job-related skills required in a variety of sectors and industries.8 As a consequence, a
large number of nationals, especially young ones, remained unemployed, despite the positive economic
growth that followed the lifting of the United Nations
(UN) sanctions in September 2003.
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The public investment spending of recent years on
major infrastructure facilities, transport, housing and
other construction, coupled with private investment
in the oil and gas sectors, generated new job opportunities, but mainly in the low-skill sector that does not
appeal to Libyans. Hence, until February 2011, some
2.5 million foreign migrants worked in construction
and agriculture jobs.9 In addition, the scarcity of technical skills among Libyans meant that most of the limited available skilled jobs went to foreigners. To rectify
this situation, Libyan authorities launched a package
of incentives and measures for foreign companies to
increase the number of Libyans in skilled positions.
During a meeting of oil companies operating in Libya
in 2009, Shukri Ghane, former Chairman of the Libyan National Oil Company, stressed the importance
of training Libyan engineers for future tenders.10 The
development of skilled human resources remains a
priority for the Libyan government to achieve its economic development and diversification plans.
High inflation rates caused by increasing food and
housing prices, coupled with the unbalanced distribution of income, led to a deterioration of living conditions for many Libyan families and among unskilled
foreign laborers. Libyans were particularly frustrated
over the fall in standards of living, while the country
had generated billions of dollars from hydrocarbon
exports—many of which had been spent on Qadhafi’s
foreign policy adventures of fighting imperialism or
the unification of Africa. Ordinary citizens argued
that a country rich in energy resources, with a relatively small population, should be able to offer high
living standards to its population, in the same manner
as in the rich Gulf states.
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To prevent the spread of food riots that hit Tunisia and Algeria in the first week of January 2011, the
Libyan government lifted taxes and import tariffs on
basic food staples.11 Further measures were also announced, including granting loans for new businesses
and housing projects. This, however, was not enough
to preempt dissent. Shortly after the flight of Tunisian president Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia on January 14,
2011, protests erupted in Libyan cities. Socioeconomic
grievances triggered riots in Benghazi and al-Baydaa.
With the lack of affordable housing an acute problem
in Libya for years, corruption and the government’s
inability to deliver promised subsidized housing units
in the scheduled timeframe had angered a broad section of the Libyan population in these cities and served
as the direct trigger for protest action.12
TRIBES AND POLITICS DURING AND AFTER
QADHAFI’S RULE
Despite a belated realization of the importance of
the tribes in Libyan social and political affairs,13 tribal
dynamics in Libya still failed to take their proper place
as a major theme of discussion and analysis during
and after the civil war. The political role of tribes cannot be understated in determining the future shape
of Libya. New political elites are currently discussing
the feasibility and modalities of engaging the tribes in
the future political system, while tensions along tribal
lines remain a risk factor likely to complicate political
transition in post-Qadhafi Libya.
There are more than 100 tribes and clans across
Libya, divided across three main ethnicities: Arab,
Berber, and African. But it is important to stress that
only a few are truly influential, and have dominated
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the political and social scene for decades. The leading
tribes are the following:
•	
Warfala: the largest tribe in the country, with
members spread across different Libyan cities,
but considering Bani Walid as its home base;
•	
Magarha: the second most populous of Libyan
tribes, inhabiting the southern regions of Wadi
al-Shati and Sebha;
•	
Zintan: concentrated in the Nafusa mountains
region in the western part of Libya. Most of its
members belong to the Amazigh minority;
•	 Obeidat: located in the northeastern cities;
• Zawiya: located in the oil-rich southeast;
• Qadhadhfa: Qadhafi’s own tribe, based in Sirte
and Sebha regions.14
With tribalism in Libya a politically sensitive topic,
there are few studies available that provide up-to-date
detailed information on the tribes. One of these few
was written by Amal Obeidi, a Libyan academic at the
University of Garyounis in Benghazi, whose empirical
study described the tribe as a still important element
shaping the identity of Libyans not only in rural areas
but also in urban centers.15 This runs counter to common expectations that the role of the tribe would have
diminished among the youth or in the major cities of
Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata; in fact, reference to
tribe remains current and popular among young urban Libyans, just as among older rural generations. In
particular, the role of Libya’s tribes in allocating socioeconomic benefits and security in the absence of effective state institutions reinforced the role of tribalism
across all Libyan regions.16
Making sense of the ambivalent political situation
of the tribes requires a brief review of Libya’s political
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history since its independence. The relation between
tribes and politics was cemented in the early days of
Libya’s struggle for independence. The power base for
the rule of King Idris (1951-69) was an alliance between
the Sanussi Order, a religious order, and Saadi tribes;
the tribal nobility constituted a significant part of the
King’s cabinet, serving as advisors and confidants.17
Over the course of the years following Qadhafi’s
arrival in power as a result of a coup in 1969, he made
attempts to dismantle the tribal alliances put in place
by the previous regime. Qadhafi replaced tribal notables who had occupied administrative positions at
regional level with young technocrats.18 The undermining and marginalization of the role of the tribes in
the early days of Qadhafi’s revolutionary regime was
driven both by tactical and ideological motives. Tactically, the aim was to remove any remaining elements
loyal to the monarchy. Meanwhile, pan-Arab nationalism was a strong ideological driver to move on from
tribalism to a political system ready to embrace not
only all Libyans, but also other Arab countries. Qadhafi for years saw himself as successor to the late
Egyptian president Jamal Abdel-Nasser in the Arab
nationalist movement. Thus, when Qadhafi referred
to “the tribe” in his Green Book, the distillation of his
political views published in stages throughout the
1970s—and omnipresent required reading in Libya
under Qadhafi—it was without any distinct political connotation. Qadhafi envisaged the tribe as a key
component of Libyan society in the same manner as
the family, providing natural social protection to its
members.19
This attempt at exclusion of tribalism from Libyan politics did not succeed for long. Several factors
pushed Qadhafi to use the tribes politically in order
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to strengthen and stabilize his regime. The most important of these factors was a disagreement over key
policy orientations and rifts among comrades of the
Revolutionary Command Council, the supreme executive and legislative body that governed Libya after
the 1969 coup and during the 1970s.20 In an open letter published in 1992, Abdul Moneim al-Honi, one of
Qadhafi’s close confidants who had served in several
important positions in the 1970s before defecting to
Egypt in 1975, described Qadhafi’s manipulation of
the tribal factions. He noted that the tribal infighting
of the past had been buried after independence, but
that Qadhafi had revived these social divisions again
in order to strengthen his grip on power.21
A number of attempts to seize power prompted
Qadhafi to accentuate tribalization still further. Most
significant among these was the 1993 rebellion and
coup attempt by military forces in Misratah, which
led to incidents in other Libyan cities including alZawiya and Sirt. In addition to arresting a number of
army officers, Qadhafi responded by turning to his
tribal kinsmen to counter increased political opposition.22 Qadhafi appointed several blood relatives and
in-laws to key security and military positions, including Brigadier Ahmad Qadhaf al-Damm and Abdullah
Sanoussi, his cousin and brother-in-law, respectively.
Al-Damm held several military and diplomatic positions including, finally, special envoy and representative of Qadhafi to some Arab countries. Sanoussi
had an extended tenure as head of internal security.
Several members of Qadhafi’s tribe also took senior
positions in the armed forces.23
Manipulating tribes and building informal tribal
alliances thus became an important part of Qadhafi’s
internal political maneuvering. The small size of the
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Qadhadhfa tribe, and its light political and economic
weight, led Qadhafi to seek informal and tacit alliances
with other key tribes in the country such as the Warfala and Magarha. Nepotism and favoritism became
the pillars sustaining Qadhafi’s informal political alliances. Appointing family members and key figures
from allied tribes in important and leading positions
was the norm, and trusted tribes were armed by the
regime. Qadhafi strengthened his power by effectively
playing the tribes against each other, promoting one
tribe over the other in different parts of the country.24
In the 1990s, the role of tribes and clans in public
life was reinforced still further with the establishment
of a nationwide system of People’s Social Leadership
Committees. Tribal and regional notables were the
main members of these new committees, which took
a number of social and bureaucratic functions over
from the central state.25 These Committees provided
welfare services to the local population, and served
as a judicial forum to settle local conflicts. They also
oversaw the implementation of socioeconomic programs in their own regions and localities.26
The military provides a case study demonstrating
the importance of tribalism in Qadhafi’s political system. In addition to the appointments of relatives and
members of loyal tribes to key military positions in
response to failed attempts to topple the regime, particularly the one in 1993, Qadhafi created a parallel security system made up of several special military units
that were assigned to persons of trust, including his
sons. These units, known as “Kataeb al-Amnia” (“Security Brigades”), were well-trained and equipped
compared to the regular army.27 The best-known
unit of this type was the 32nd Reinforced Brigade,
known as the “Khamis Brigade,” led by Qadhafi’s
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son Khamis. This unit was based close to Benghazi,
a city that had seen the majority of the uprisings and
revolts against Qadhafi’s regime over the previous 4
decades—as well as being at the source of the most recent one, which eventually ended Qadhafi’s rule.28 In
the event, Qadhafi’s security calculations were proved
entirely correct. In the early days of the February 17
revolution, several senior army officers defected and
joined the rebel forces, including Chief of Staff AbuBakr Younes Jaber. Meanwhile, the Kataeb al-Amnia
constituted the main fighting elements opposing the
rebels over the 8 months of the civil war.
The civil war period saw tribal leaders convening
to discuss the security and political situation. A number of loyalty statements were issued, in favor either
of Qadhafi’s regime or of the rebels. Tribal notables
were keen to show their importance on the political
scene, and that they were still a political force not to
be ignored.29 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the capture of Tripoli by rebel forces, several tribal delegations travelled to Qatar to offer thanks to the Qatari
rulers for their support during the fighting.30 These
visits have continued during the establishment of the
new Libyan state, despite criticism by Libyan nationalists and a political elite aspiring to build a modern
and unified democracy.
Thus, in the interests of stability and the avoidance of further conflict, the management and mitigation of Libya’s tribal dynamics in the post-revolution
environment is every bit as important as it was during
the reigns of King Idris and Qadhafi himself, and the key
nature of this challenge should not be underestimated
by foreign partners engaging with the new Libyan
regime.
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CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW LIBYA
This section examines the key transitional challenges that lie ahead for the interim government in
moving from the old order to a new, possibly democratic, system. It will highlight the problem of armed
groups in post-Qadhafi Libya and the challenges they
represent to the authority of the new political leadership and to the country’s stability. This section will
also focus on the daunting task of building the fundamental pillars of democracy in a country that for more
than 4 decades was run by an opaque political system,
with limited civil institutions and no political parties.
Drawing up a constitution for Libya will not be
straightforward. Political infighting between secularists and Islamists has already surfaced on varying issues of political significance to Libya’s future, including vital elements such as the structure and religious
identity of the state.31
Security Challenges.
Ensuring continued security in the broad sense is
a critical concern for the new regime in building the
foundation on which advances can be made in the
political and socioeconomic spheres. Yet, at the time
of this writing, the new interim government remains
fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty, and the
inability to enforce security is still a critical challenge.
Threats to security arising directly from the remaining supporters of the Qadhafi regime receded
after the arrest of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi.32 Saif al-Islam
had been a source of concern to Libya’s new political
leadership and to the international community, be-
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cause of his ability to seek contacts with his own tribe
and other loyal groups to launch attacks on the new
government.
In addition to his importance within the old regime as detailed above, Saif al-Islam was his father’s
“secrets keeper,” which afforded him intimate knowledge of the power dynamics of the regime. It would
thus have been easy for him to gather support, particularly among those Qadhafi loyalists who suffered
from reprisal atrocities perpetuated by the rebel forces
during the civil war and after the death of Qadhafi.
He could have easily exploited revenge calls from the
Warfala tribe in Bani Walid against the National Transitional Council (NTC) and rebel forces.33
Saadi, Qadhafi’s third son, who escaped to Niger,
does not constitute a threat to the new regime; neither
do Qadhafi’s wife and daughter Aicha, who are now
refugees in Algeria, since they had no political role or
official position in the security apparatus. The arrest
of Sanoussi, Qadhafi’s head of intelligence and brother-in-law, in Mauritania in March 2012 has weakened
any potential threat from the old regime.34 At the time
of this writing, the Mauritanian authorities have not
responded to any of the extradition demands presented by Libya, France, and the International Criminal
Court.
The Challenge of Armed Militias.
Despite the mitigation of the threat from supporters of the old regime, the interim government has
no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The
establishment of the Tripoli Military Council by the
NTC was intended to provide security in the capital
of Libya, and to be the first step in setting up a professional national army. But the Council, led by com16

mander Abdel Hakim Belhaj, is not even able to exercise control over military affairs within Tripoli, let
alone across the country.35
Hundreds of armed fighters belonging to different
militias moved to Tripoli in September 2011. Dozens
of separate armed groups took control of Tripoli’s key
neighborhoods;36 as well as strategic infrastructure,
such as ports, airports, and border crossings across the
country. The militias still patrol the capital, setting up
their own checkpoints in defiance of the governmentappointed authorities. For example, the Zintan militia
is in control of the city’s airport and other areas within
Tripoli.37 With the aim of maximizing their political
power, some brigades have extended control to landmark buildings within Tripoli, such as those containing the diplomatic representations of important countries.38
The large number of distinct militias arose during
the civil war because of the regional and tribal divisions within the country. The rebel forces were not
all unified under a single command during the fights
against pro-Qadhafi forces.39 Even in eastern Libya,
where the NTC controlled the most organized rebel
force, relations between rebel groups were far from
cordial, and some militias continued their intention to
act independently. The assassination of rebel leader
General Abdelfattah Younes on July 28, 2011, by a
radical faction of the rebel forces highlighted discord
among the rebels, which constituted a major challenge
to NTC cohesion.40 This issue remains unresolved, as
the details of Younes’s murder have still not been released, nor any suspects named.
The militias, initially an instrument of liberation,
very swiftly became a source of concern to the NTC
and to the residents of Tripoli. Some of the militias are
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accused directly of the violence and vandalism that
took place after the fall of the capital, and frequent
clashes between members of the different brigades
have become a norm there. During the first week of
December 2011, Tripoli’s inhabitants protested, demanding the departure of armed militias from their
city. A few days after these protests, gun battles
erupted between members of the Zintan militia, who
aimed to demonstrate their independence from the interim government and its institutions, and followers
of Brigadier Khalifa Haftar, a commanding officer of
the yet-to-be-built Libyan National Army.41 Renewed
fighting between militias in the first week of January
2012 led NTC leader Mustapha Abdeljalil to warn of
the risks of another civil war.42
All of these factors cause continuing significant
disruption to the lives of ordinary citizens, and dealing with the issue is a stated priority for the interim
government. The establishment of the National Army’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is seen
as the solution.
Mahmud Jibril, the former interim head of the
NTC’s executive board, who resigned on October 23,
2011, listed a series of options to solve the issue of
the rebel brigades. He suggested that the thousands
of rebel fighters—most of whom joined the revolution with no military training—would be offered the
chance to join the army or the Interior Ministry, which
oversees the police. Another option would be to form
Libyan security companies, which would help guard
businesses and oil facilities.43
This is easier said than done. Most of the brigades
are not willing to hand over their weapons or to leave
Tripoli. They claim that their armed presence is necessary for the security of the state at this crucial moment,
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since they maintain security in view of the potential
for insurgencies led by the remnants of the Qadhafi
regime.44 In addition, the militias are concerned about
their marginalization from the new political order—
learning from observation of the experiences of neighboring countries (Egypt and Tunisia) where the youth
movements that led the revolutions were subsequently excluded from power. Maintaining an armed presence in Tripoli is to be used as political leverage to
secure a role in the new Libya.45
Without the formation of a new army and the collecting of weapons, security will remain loose, and
the NTC will remain a political formation without levers to implement its will. The inability to act and to
control state affairs has been a source of frustration to
many of the NTC’s members. Mahmud Jibril publicly
listed several reasons for his resignation, including his
lack of control not only of military but also of civilian
affairs. In an interview with the pan-Arab news channel Al-Arabiya, he cited an example to demonstrate
the ineffectiveness of NTC control: After the liberation of Tripoli, militias went into public institutions,
banks, oil entities and other public companies and
changed their boards of directors, without consultation with the NTC or its executive office. Jibril’s frustration also stemmed from the lack of strong support
for secularists, compared to the Islamic factions of the
NTC, which have the backing of Qatar.46 Decisions
were made with no clarity as to who was behind them
or how they were going to be implemented, such as
the introduction of visa requirements.47 The current
interim government has very limited administrative capacity to perform its duties as a sovereign and
effective state.
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At the time of this writing, the interim government’s precise strategy with relation to the armed
groups remains unclear. A number of attempts to
persuade the armed groups to hand over their weapons appear to have convinced NTC leader Mustapha
Abdejalil that the demilitarizing of these groups may
not be as easy as first thought. He then decided to delay the collection of arms for the foreseeable future, in
order, paradoxically, to avoid a renewed breakout of
political violence.48
Yet, as time passes, the risk of increased low-level
violence and criminal activities increases.49 The armed
groups require sources of income to maintain their
stay in Tripoli. The question then becomes how they
are to generate the money. It is considered probable
that at least some of the militias will become involved
in further illegal activities, such as levying protection
fees, trading in narcotics, or kidnapping for ransom.
The security risks of Libya’s uncontrolled armed
militias are not restricted to within the country’s national borders. By jeopardizing state-building efforts,
clashes between militias or between militias and government authorities threaten to undermine the security of neighboring countries and the international
community. Risks include renewed waves of refugee
flows to Tunisia, Egypt, and across the Mediterranean
to Italy and beyond, and disruption to oil production—depriving the international market of Libyan oil
once again and harming the economic interests of U.S.
and European companies.
Furthermore, the current lack of a capable national army leaves Libya an open playing field to be
exploited by international criminal groups active in
the region. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or other
Jihadist groups based in North Africa, the Sahel, and
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Europe are expected to establish training camps in
uncontrolled Libyan territory, as well as developing
links with some of the militias to acquire arms. During
several months of fighting, the revolutionary fighters
had access to weapon storages. Late-2011 saw media
reporting the trafficking of Libyan arms in the Sahel
region.50
Uncontrolled stocks of weapons include systems
that could be of immediate interest to terrorist groups
and other entities hostile to the United States and
its allies, such as man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS), including SA-24 Igla (GRINCH) missiles. Securing these systems should be treated as an
immediate priority for both the Libyan government
and its foreign partners.51
Armed militias are already directly affecting relations with Libya’s neighbors. In early-December 2011,
as a response to continuous assaults on its citizens and
territorial integrity by Libyan armed groups, Tunisia
closed two crossing points and deployed additional
military personnel to control its borders with Libya.52
The ambitions of the interim government are constrained by its lack of authority and capacity to influence the armed groups. But they are also inhibited by
the lack of a clear security reform strategy that includes
specific measures for the disarmament and reintegration of revolutionary fighters, and the management of
legacy armaments in general. The sooner the interim
government launches its security reform plan, the better the chances of success for political transition. Assistance to the interim authorities in implementing
security reform in order to mitigate the risks outlined
above should therefore be a key priority of the United
States and other foreign partners.
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Political Transition: Avoiding the “Rotten Door”
Democracy Fate.
The recent, and neighboring, cases of Egypt and
Tunisia present vivid illustrations to demonstrate the
risks and challenges that countries like Libya face in
political transition. In both countries, post-revolution
consolidation was not peaceful. The ousting of former
leaders and the establishment of interim political bodies were not sufficient to appease public anger. The Tunisian and Egyptian peoples, seeing themselves as the
guardians of their popular revolutions, regularly took
to the streets presenting political demands. Growing
disenchantment with the political performance of the
Military Council in Egypt has led to new riots and political violence 10 months after the toppling of Hosni
Mubarak.
The circumstances of each country define precisely
how political instability will manifest itself. This phenomenon is not limited to North Africa nor the Arab
world: Examples are available from Europe, including
the case of Portugal, whose transition toward democracy was full of societal tensions for 2 years following
the military coup in 1974. Tensions abated only when
the constitution was finally enacted and the first elections were held.53
In the case of Libya, the experience will be shaped
by the lack of ordinary political institutions, a long
civil war, and tribal and regional divisions. In September 2011, the Libyan NTC announced its political
roadmap for the transitional period, with a program
resembling Tunisia’s post-revolution transition. The
Libyan provisional government seeks to hold its first
elections for a constituent assembly in June 2012.54
Once elected, the constituent assembly will draft the
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country’s constitution and hold parliamentary elections in 1 year’s time—a very ambitious program that
perhaps fails to take into account the special situation
of Libya.
There are many hurdles that are likely to make the
transition lengthy and difficult, if not prevent its success altogether. Libyans could discover that they are
facing an incomplete, “rotten-door” transition. Political scientists and experts in political transitions Steven
Levitsky and Lucan Way define rotten-door transitions as those that “occur in a context of state, party,
and civil society, weakness [where] new governments
are often filled with elites from the old regime.”55 They
argue that the collapse of autocratic regimes often
does not ensure democracy, especially if the collapse
takes place in a context of extreme state weakness or
in a country with weak civil society. The rapid and
chaotic nature of transitions by rupture often results
in little real institutional change, Levitsky and Way
argue, with post-transition governments often being led by politicians with no strong commitment to
democracy.56 Although the overthrow of Qadhafi’s
regime was neither swift nor easy, Libya presents a
prime example of a state that lacks political parties,
state institutions, and civil society.
Building Legitimate Institutions.
A key challenge confronting the interim government in Libya is the creation of political institutions to
provide for the functioning of an effective democratic
state. The interim government is in effect inheriting a
stateless state.
After seizing power, Qadhafi dismantled all the
political institutions that were in place under King
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Idris, and replaced them with people’s committees.57
This dismantling of the state was more of a process
than a single event, with the latest development as recent as 2008, when Qadhafi announced a controversial
plan to abolish most of the ministries as a measure to
fight corruption. Instead, he promised to establish a
system of wealth transfer directly into the hands of the
people. This promise never came to fruition.58
In fact, the dismantling of the state went as far
as abolishing the actual position of the head of state.
With the effect from the replacement of the Revolution
Command Council by the General People’s Council
in the late-1970s, Qadhafi claimed to hold no official
position. His official title was “Leader of the Revolution.” In reality, this allowed him to run the country
with no formal responsibility or accountability whatsoever. Nonetheless, denial of any official position did
not prevent Qadhafi from being represented as, and
treated as, head of the Libyan state by the international community. In addition, Libya’s political system
has known no constitution or political parties under
Qadhafi’s rule. No separation of powers, or discussion
thereof, has been attempted since the country’s independence. Several of Qadhafi’s political committees
combined executive and legislative powers, with commonly overlapping powers and responsibilities and
no clear division of agencies. The system of political
accountability was unclear—which is not to say that
it did not exist—and was manipulated to serve the
interest of the ruling elite. Freedom of the press was
absent for decades, with the only permitted media
serving as an integral part of the regime’s propaganda
machinery.59
Carciana del Castillo, an economist with expertise
on post-crisis state building, argues that countries
in Libya’s situation are confronted with a “multi24

pronged” transition. All aspects of this transition are
closely interrelated and reinforce each other. Violence
must give way to public security. Lawlessness, political exclusion, and violations of human rights must
give way to the rule of law, inclusive and participatory government, and respect for human rights. Polarization among different groups must give way to national reconciliation. Castillo notes: “Failure in any of
these areas will put the others at risk. Planning, management, coordination, and financing of this multipronged transition are highly burdensome.”60 The
current lack of capacity of the interim government,
therefore, is dangerous when it attempts to address
all these challenges and create all these institutions,
simultaneously. Even reconstruction of the public
healthcare system in Libya is a pressing issue: In December 2011, an article in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine identified that rebuilding the public
health system, seriously degraded during the civil
war, had not even reached the stage of initial evaluation research of what exists and what is needed.61
The Democratic Culture Deficit.
Qadhafi’s regime opposed the idea of political parties from the very start of the revolution. Mahmoud
al-Maghribi, Libya’s prime minister after the 1969
revolution, noted during a press conference that “party organisations are unlikely to have any role in the
Libyan Arab Republic.”62 This approach received ideological backing when Qadhafi published his political thoughts, known as the “Third Universal Theory,”
which purported to pass power directly to the people
without any need for other political agents.
Abubaker Altajuri, a Libyan opposed to Qadhafi,
described the situation eloquently in a letter com25

menting on a Foreign Policy magazine article in 1999.
He noted: “In Libya, people are not only prevented
from expressing independent opinions, they are prevented from even conceiving of them.”63 This situation
remained unchanged, even during talks on political
openness during the 2000s.
As result, there was no authorized opposition force
in the country for 4 decades, and, in fact, the only organized political forces that opposed and threatened
Qadhafi’s regime within Libya were illegal Islamist
groups: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The regime’s response to this
threat was brutal, including direct military intervention in 1996-97 to quell the Islamist threat in eastern
Libyan cities.
Meanwhile, outside the country, several opposition groups and parties were formed in Egypt, Switzerland, the UK, and other Western states with the
aim of campaigning against Qadhafi’s regime. Toppling the regime was the primary focus of all Libyan
opposition groups’ activities.64
There is a consensus within Libya that one of the
emblematic features of the new democratic era is going to be the establishment of political parties. At the
time of this writing, several groups and movements
are preparing to form political parties, and waiting
for the appropriate law to be passed.65 But because the
opposition to the previous regime had worked either
clandestinely or from exile, its contact with and impact on the masses within Libya was extremely limited. As a consequence, most Libyans now have no
experience or knowledge of the political dynamics of
a democracy. Furthermore, the absence of freedoms of
association and the press inhibited the development of
any form of democratic culture among Libyans. This
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absence of culture will inevitably have an impact on
the political transition and on state-building efforts.
Some Libyan intellectuals say they are seeking democratization in its broad sense, limited not only to
elections, but also to include freedom of expression,
political plurality, promotion of civil society, and
protection of human rights.66 There is a keen interest
in avoiding the emergence of another authoritarian
regime, or what Levitsky and Way call a “hybrid regime,” which combines elections with various degrees
of authoritarianism.67
Achieving all these goals requires, in addition to
good intentions, a change in people’s ways of thinking. International experience shows that a change in
the behavioral patterns of the past is the most difficult
part of political transition. Viktor Orban, the Hungarian politician, eloquently explained the difficulty of
moving from communism to democracy in Hungary
during the 1990s. He said the “the bricks of the Berlin
Wall have been snapped up by Japanese and American tourists, while here the remains of the wall have
remained in the people’s spirits, in their way of thinking, in the economy, in the social system, in the education system, and in many other areas of social life.”68
The Tribal Dilemma: Inclusion or Exclusion?
Despite the important role of the tribes in Libyan
society, there is only a narrow base of support among
the new Libyan political elite—constituted of members of the NTC, opposition abroad, and some academics—for a tribal-based political system. Despite
the youth attitudes cited above, urban Libyan intellectuals are wary of tribal politics, as representing a
regression to primordial political structures and an
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obstacle to creating a united and democratic Libya
where all Libyans are treated equally. For many urban
elites, a tribal system connotes dominance by elderly
males, inhibiting societal development. Many Libyan
intellectuals instead have expressed wishes for political allegiance in Libya to be based on the state and on
the basis of citizenship, seeing the tribe instead as a
social umbrella with only a limited role in national
politics over the long term. This, however, remains a
minority elite view.
The early days of the revolution saw clear manifestations of this divergence in thinking. The statements of the NTC leaders and the slogans of protesters across Libyan cities, including Tripoli, were calling
for a united Libya. These calls came also in reaction to
Saif al-Islam’s warning of the country’s possible split
into different regions in a controversial speech on February 20. In that speech, Saif al-Islam warned Libyans
and the international community that Libya is a tribal
society and that clashes could escalate into civil war,
with a risk that the country would split into its three
pre-independence regions. Calls for a united Libya
appear to be based on strong political belief shared by
nationalists, secularists, and Islamists.69
Furthermore, building a political system that is focused on tribalism rather than ideologies carries a risk
of creating a societal hierarchy and territorial divisions. It creates tensions between those who are inside
the political system and those who are not. In the view
of the new political elite, the citizenship principle,
regardless of tribal and ethnical affiliations, must be
embodied in the new constitution. No political formation or other civil society institution should make reference to tribes or regions.70 However, the challenges
of the political transition, and the strong role of the
tribes as detailed above, dictate that the new interim
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government must necessarily take into account the
demands of certain tribes and regions. Abdul Alhakim al-Feitouri, a Libyan academic, argues that failing
to accommodate the tribes in the transitional period
could lead to the “Balkanization of Libya.”71
The new interim government formed on November 21, 2011, has implicitly attempted to balance tribal,
regional, and armed groups representations. It did not
accommodate every faction that exists in the country,
but managed to achieve a balanced distribution of ministerial posts. All political persuasions are represented
in the interim government, including both Islamists
and secularists. The important ministerial positions
of Defence and Interior were allocated to Osama AlJuwali and Fawzi Abdelalai, representatives from the
Zintan and Misrata militias, respectively.72 These two
militias are considered the largest and best-armed in
comparison with other groups.
The outcome of the interim-leadership work in
forming the new government did not satisfy all the
factions. Several protests erupted again in Libyan
cities. The Berber groups, long oppressed under Qadhafi’s regime, resented their exclusion from power.
The perception among Berbers was that their significant numbers and substantial contribution during the
civil war were not taken into account. Other protests
over marginalization and the failure of the new government to recognize contributions to the toppling of
Qadhafi’s rule took place in Benghazi and Ajdabya.
In sum, tribes play an important role in the daily
life of many Libyans, and are likely to continue to
do so for the foreseeable future. Under a new regime
that does not favor tribal politics, tribal leaders might
agree to take a limited role at the national political
level, but will likely want to keep their political influ-
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ence at the regional level. Leading tribes in different
areas of the country will have great aspirations to
play an important role in their respective regions. It
is likely that they will call for a decentralized political system that will accommodate their demands and
aspirations. Any attempt to ignore and marginalize
the tribes’ demands is certain to exacerbate the fragile
transitional process toward a modern and democratic
Libya. Once again, the United States and other foreign
partners engaging with the new Libyan state need to
be aware of the limitations on the power and reach of
that state imposed by the tribal nature of its society.
Handling Ideological and Political Differences.
Observation of political discussions among Libyan
intellectuals in late-2011 only confirmed that political
transition there is going to be laborious and intense.
Opinions differ on the form of the state, its identity,
and the administrative structures that have to be included in the country’s first constitution. The current
debates among Libyans have revived memories of
similar discussions that took place before Libya’s independence under the auspices of the UN. At that time,
the main issue of discussion within the UN Council
for Libya was over adopting a federal or unitary form
for the state of Libya.73 The federalist voices, calling
for the country’s division into three states, Cyrenaica,
Fezzan, and Tripolitania, lost the debate.
One could argue that differences of opinion are a
healthy sign for a democracy in the making. But the
lack of institutions and processes that regulate political debate in any country make political discord a risky
undertaking. Different groups are wary of each other,
and suspect each other of following foreign agendas.
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These fundamental differences are not limited to
academic circles and intellectuals, but also exist within the provisional government. Factional infighting
emerged in the early months of the existence of the
NTC. As an interim political body for the rebels, the
NTC included members from different political persuasions, including both those representing the opposition abroad, and those who had served their entire
lives under Qadhafi’s regime. The entity thus lacked
any cohesion among its members in the early stages.
But the main division that has emerged at the time of
this writing is ideological and/or religious: frictions
between secularist- and Islamist-dominated NTC discussions in late-2011.
The unifying factor that had kept the NTC from
fissure was the fight against Qadhafi, with the result
that a leadership battle resurfaced after the fall of
Tripoli. The announcement by NTC leader Mustapha
Abdeljalil that Islam was to be the basis for legislation
brought divisions within the Council to the surface.74
Several secularist figures voiced grievances publicly,
complaining of their alienation by the Islamist wing
backed by external players. Libyan diplomat Abdulrahman Shalgam voiced his dissatisfaction with Qatar’s support of one side against other factions.75
Truth Recovery and Reconciliation.
Another important task for the interim government, and an important step for the stability of the
country, is to organize a truth recovery and reconciliation initiative. International experience, including in
the cases of South Africa and Morocco, shows that
reconciliation initiatives in post-conflict situations or
following regime or political change constitute an im-
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portant step toward healing the wounds of the past,
and that they strengthen political transitions.76
What and whom to reconcile in Libya are important questions. The new interim regime has not only
to address atrocities committed over decades by the
Qadhafi regime against individuals77 and tribal antagonism; it also has to deal with human rights violations
that occurred during the conflict between rebel and
pro-Qadhafi forces. Violations reported by international human rights organizations included torture of
war prisoners, mass killing, and rape.78
At the time of this writing, the interim government is unable to launch a formal initiative, despite
increasingly strident calls from Libyan intellectuals;79
it is inhibited by the lack of state institutions that are
important for the working of any reconciliation process—such as a parliament, a functioning judiciary
system, and forces of law and order. Truth recovery
would be a risky endeavor if carried out by a provisional government that is still weak, as it could become a factor that deepens rifts in society.
Nevertheless, at the end of November 2011, the
NTC convened a national reconciliation meeting in
the city of Zawiya, where representatives of tribes and
clans from across the country discussed the importance of addressing the rifts of the past and the ways
of doing so.80 The event was intended to convey a clear
message to Libyans regarding the new government’s
intentions to handle all the issues of the past that could
fuel societal tensions. The event also aimed to raise
awareness and familiarize Libyans with the concept of
reconciliation, through discussion of other countries’
experiences—the intention being to reduce the risk of
tension during the framing and implementation of the
reconciliation process by ensuring that participants
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and the audience are familiar with the process and its
philosophy.
Given the crucial importance of reconciliation
initiatives for stability during transition, the United
States and other foreign partners should encourage
these efforts and provide targeted support for the
process.
Economic Reconstruction Imperatives.
Delivering a degree of economic prosperity is a
prerequisite for successful transition. With economic
conditions degraded following the months of civil
war, building an economy has become an immediate
priority for the current and coming governments. The
prolonged political crisis, and the ensuing uncertainty,
pushed away both foreign and national investors. According to the Bank of International Settlements, $2.2
billion of domestic capital left Libya in the first quarter
of 2011.81 During the crisis, economic activity in Libya
was paralyzed as a result of the closure of factories,
ports, and roads for months. This disruption of business activity resulted in huge economic losses. The
economic cost of Libya’s civil war has been estimated
by the Libyan Central Bank at around $15 billion.82
Nevertheless, by some measures Libya is in a
relatively strong economic situation compared with
its neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt, both of which are
expecting 2011 to show substantial falls in economic
growth. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth
in Egypt is expected to drop to 1 percent in 2011 from
5.1 percent in 2010, and in Tunisia, the forecast GDP
growth for 2011 is 1.3 percent against 3.7 percent the
previous year.83 The governments in Tunisia and
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Egypt would like to stimulate the economy through
public investments, but their capacity is limited by the
lack of public funds; both countries need external financing to stabilize the worsening balance of payment
situations.
By contrast, Libya has a broad spread of projects
and services to spend money on, and access to ready
funds to do so, which is expected to lead to strong GDP
growth once political stability is restored. Libya is fortunate to hold good reserves that will help the interim
government meet the socioeconomic needs of its citizens, as well as pay for the reconstruction of the state
without resorting to international borrowing. Over
the recent years of high oil prices, Libya accumulated
a large amount of wealth, and currently holds around
$110 billion of foreign assets.84 By May 2012, most of
the foreign assets held by Libyan Central Bank and
some state-owned commercial institutions that were
frozen internationally following the UN sanctions had
been released, with part of them transferred to the
current Libyan authorities. The process of unfreezing
assets of Libyan origin in some African countries has
been more complex due to political and transparency
reasons. First, some African countries were reluctant
to recognize the NTC as the legitimate representative
of the Libyan people in the early months following the
collapse of Qadhafi’s regime.
Second, it remains unclear whether some parts of
Libya’s investment in the African continent were the
personal wealth of Qadhafi’s family, or holdings of
the Libyan state.85 It is important to note that the UN
lifting of sanctions on Libyan assets did not include
assets of Qadhafi’s family and former members of
his regime, which remain frozen. The future of such
funds depends on the outcome of each member’s trial,
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and the restitution of some assets might prove impossible. A panel of experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973 highlighted in its report
the difficulty of identifying, tracing, and repatriating
assets of key members of the former regime and their
families as result of embezzlement of public funds and
corruption.86 It is to be hoped that the Libyan Investment Authority, with its $65 billion worth of assets
and accumulated investment experience, should play
a key role in the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and economy.87
In addition to reserves, the interim government
can also rely on hydrocarbon production and exportation revenues—and is therefore understandably keen
to restore hydrocarbon production. Oil production
reached 840,000 barrels per day at the end of November 2011, only a few weeks after the fall of the Qadhafi
regime, and there is optimism that the new regime
might increase production to the pre-war level of 1.6
million barrels a day by the end of 2012.88 Libya was
lucky that war damage was limited only to support
infrastructure and has not affected key production facilities.89 To return to the pre-war oil production level,
Libya not only depends on the repair of infrastructure
facilities, but also on the return of foreign skilled labor; part of the loss of production at the start of the
civil war was due solely to the departure of international workers.90
The availability of adequate finances will reduce
the number of challenges that the government is facing
in the immediate and short term. But the essential economic development question for Libya remains precisely what type of development strategies to pursue.
There is an urgent need for comprehensive plans to
tackle the structural economic problems that triggered
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the revolution in the first place. This will include improving living standards for Libyans, and developing
new sources of wealth away from the hydrocarbon
sector in order to create enough jobs to meet the rising
number of new entrants to the labor market. Unemployment in Libya, already high as noted above, was
exacerbated still further by the paralysis of almost all
economic activities during the civil war.91
LOOKING AHEAD: THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AND LIBYA
As the Libyan interim government continues to
struggle to maintain law and order while simultaneously facing the daunting tasks of state-building ab
initio, the United States and other leading actors in the
international community can assist in maintaining stability by engaging and providing vitally needed help.
This assistance is essential to avoid destabilization and
deterioration within Libya, gravid with consequences
not only for Libyan citizens, but for neighbors and energy consumers both in North Africa and Europe.
The involvement of the international community
should be focused on what Libya needs in order to
perform its functions as an effective sovereign state,
both at a national and international level. U.S. and
UN expertise in disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) of armed fighters in post-conflict
situations could be of pivotal help to Libya at this
critical juncture, but such support should be provided
carefully. Although the situation on the ground at the
time of this writing suggests that the interim government in Libya would appreciate external help with the
armed militias, any level of visible foreign military
presence in Libya, particularly from the West, risks
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igniting more political instability than it resolves. Any
DDR assistance would be best provided through diplomatic channels in the form of continuous advisory
and monitoring support. Contributions could also be
delivered in the form of special training courses to
middle- and high-ranking military officers, provided
in U.S. and/or European military colleges. The United
States could also work in conjunction with other Arab
countries such as Jordan and Morocco to train Libyan
rebel fighters and integrate them into the national
army. Training in other Arab countries seems a viable
solution. In April 2012, Jordan started the training of
10,000 policemen at its International Police Centre
near the capital of Amman.92 But use or deployment
of visible military assets by the United States or the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would
have limited, or no, support within Libya and in the
wider Arab region, and would serve only to fuel conspiracy theories about interest in Libyan oil and new
colonialism.
Preventing hostile exploitation of Libya’s vast
territory and largely uncontrolled borders remains a
key task for the international community while Libya
still lacks a national army. The new Libya needs wellequipped and well-trained military forces to protect
and secure its approximately 4,000 kilometer (km)long land border, shared with six countries, and its
national territory. The new security apparatus that
will be put in place should be trained to play a neutral role in internal political life, and specifically avoid
domination by or favoritism toward specific tribes or
clans over others. A new security system will reduce
the risk of intimidation and violence during Libya’s
political transition. The United States and other international partners with experience in building security
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forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are well-placed to offer
this experience to Libya.
The United States and the international community can provide assistance in building state institutions and processes, once the political ambitions of
the leading revolutionary commanders are satisfied
or mitigated and the process of reintegration of excombatants is in an advanced stage.
International nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) have much scope to support the nascent democratic political culture and civil society in Libya. The
new Libya requires the establishment and strengthening of a party system, elections, media, and an independent judiciary. Technical assistance in setting up
legal systems on political and economic fronts is an
essential prerequisite for Libya’s transition toward
democracy.
Libya occupies a strategically important position
in the Maghreb and the Sahel, a region that is considered of increasing importance to U.S. global security
strategy. In March 2012, the Libyan government hosted a regional conference on border security, with the
aims of setting up collaboration mechanisms and procedures with neighboring countries and conveying a
message to the international community that Libya
takes its border issues very seriously.93 However, given the lack of financial and human resources primarily
in countries like Chad and Nigeria, it is likely that the
collaborative efforts with Libya’s southern neighbors
will be less than fully effective.
The porous state of Libyan borders is not only a
threat to Libya’s stability, but also to other countries
in its vicinity and beyond. Immigration, international
terrorism, and transnational organized crime could affect the interests of European countries and the inter-
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national community, in addition to their implications
for Libya’s internal stability. Yet, the Libyan security
forces in their present form do not have sufficient professional personnel, equipment, or surveillance technology to control Libya's borders effectively.
This is not a task the new Libya can manage alone,
and this is a key area in which international assistance
is essential for Libya’s state-building efforts. There is
a potentially important enabling role in this area for
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), particularly in
light of the improvement of the security environment
in Africa being a key element of AFRICOM’s mission.
In June 2012, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General
Ray Odierno signaled increasing importance for the
train and advise mission in Africa, in particular due
to the fact that “terrorist elements around the world
go to the areas they think [have] the least resistance
. . . and right now, you could argue that’s Africa.”94
Libya is a prime example of this potential, and AFRICOM should consider the case of Libya as a priority,
given the security repercussions already felt by neighboring countries. The flow of weapons and militants
is increasingly destabilizing the Maghreb and Sahel
regions, and prompt action to mitigate this situation
would prove cost effective in restraining the further
spread of instability.
The planned assignment of a Brigade Combat
Team to AFRICOM in 2013 to act as a pilot program
for the Regionally Aligned Force concept provides an
opportunity to build on immediate mitigating action
in conjunction with the Libyan authorities. Conversely, if AFRICOM fails to engage promptly in Libya, the
credibility of AFRICOM as a reliable actor and partner
for the security of Africa will come into question in
the region. Given the U.S. concerns about internation-
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al terrorism, many would find it incomprehensible if
AFRICOM took no visible action to counter expanding instability resulting from Libya’s challenges.
The U.S. military is well-positioned to leverage its
expertise and experience to design a comprehensive
solution for border control and provide support in
implementation. In particular, help could be offered
to the Libyan authorities to control Libya’s southern
borders, while a collaborative effort involving European partners would be conceivable for Libya’s sea
borders with European neighbors.
The aim should be working together with the
Libyan authorities in order to enhance their capabilities of providing for their own security. In addition
to enhancing the security of neighboring states, a U.S.
contribution of this type would strengthen the current
fragile peace and help prevent any relapse into civil
war.
Time is of the essence in the case of Libya. Prompt
engagement with and support for the current Libyan
authorities is essential for a wide range of reasons.
First, it will ensure that the continued confrontations
among armed rival militants do not spread and develop into a second civil war. Second, engagement will
curb the further spread of instability to other neighboring countries. Last, but not least, achieving political and economic stability will have a strong positive
impact not only on Libya, but also on neighboring
countries in North Africa and Europe—securing important long-term political and economic allies in a region key both for the United States and for long-term
partners in Europe.
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CONCLUSION
It invites little controversy to say that removing
Muammar Qadhafi was the easy part in Libya’s fight
for liberation, compared with the daunting tasks of
building a state in the post-Qadhafi era. Libya’s interim government is facing as difficult a moment as
any other country in the region that has experienced
a revolution. The new Libyan leadership inherits a
distinctly messy political situation, with multiple, simultaneous, and urgent major challenges. In addition
to building political institutions, maintaining security,
withdrawing weapons, and creating a new national
army, Libya has also to meet urgent demands to rectify both the crimes and the mistakes of the old regime.
Initiating a truth-recovery process is essential to ensure victims that the crimes of Qadhafi’s regime or of
the civil war will not go unaddressed or unpunished.
The Libyan people have high expectations following the end of authoritarian rule by Qadhafi, but the
provisional government is constrained by the absence
of institutions to meet all the demands at once. One
of the key challenges is the lack of experienced politicians who can lead a democratic transition. With the
exception of those few figures who defected from
Qadhafi’s regime, there is even a dearth of national
figures with any experience in managing state affairs. Under Qadhafi, state affairs were managed by
a handful of technocrats, who occupied, in rotation,
ministerial and management positions in state-owned
companies.
The government not only needs to build basic state
institutions that allow it to exercise its duties as a provider of services to its own citizens, but it has yet to
establish itself as the sole user of legitimate violence.
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In the aftermath of the fall of Tripoli, the interim government has announced its road map to democracy;
a series of laws, procedures and institutions have to
be put in place for the next elections. But simultaneously, a solution to the fundamental security issue has
to be provided. Demilitarizing the armed militias and
building a national army is a prerequisite not only for
strengthening state capacity and credibility, but also
essential for the achievement of other transitional reforms.
One final and crucial point is that any exclusion
of the reality of Libyan tribalism from the political
calculus will be highly damaging and will inevitably
trigger more tensions. Libya’s tribes are conscious of
their importance and aspire to play a political role,
at least on a regional level. The conventions of tribes
in late-2011 to debate the future structure of the state
and to discuss federation, central government, and a
bicameral parliamentary system among other key issues, send a strong signal that the tribes want a political place in the new Libya. However progressive the
instincts of the new government, it would be unwise
to attempt to deny it.
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